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In the Multiagency Operating Environment of the 21st Century, Are Joint Qualified Officers Enough?

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24 October 2008



A research paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the U. S. NAVY.

Signature: _____

Although the Military Departments have established operationally proven processes and standards, it is clear that further advances in joint education and training are urgently needed to prepare for complex, multinational and interagency operations in the future.

- 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, pg, 77.

In the multinational and interagency - or multiagency - operating environment of the 21st century, the Department of Defense (DoD) centric development process used to certify Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs) and operational level leaders is inadequate. **The 21st century multiagency operating environment requires military officers to have competencies and perspectives beyond those provided by the current military-focused service and joint leader development processes.** The challenges of the 21st century cannot be met by a single service, agency, military, or nation. “Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.”¹ United States (U.S.) Navy officers must be able to effectively lead, operate, plan, and integrate in not only the joint environment, but in the multiagency environment. The U.S. Navy needed 21 years to fully incorporate the joint service officer development process called for in Goldwater-Nichols legislation.² In today’s fast-paced, globalized, multiagency world, the Navy cannot afford to take another two decades to adapt its leader development process to meet the requirements of the emerging operating environment. Nor should DoD wait for the U.S. Congress to enact new legislation to update Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency to begin to reshape the process. Instead, DoD and the U.S. Navy must take the lead and institute improvements in the leader development process now to provide 21st century operational leaders with the education and experience needed to meet the challenges of the multiagency environment.

This paper will consider how the U.S. Navy and DoD can accomplish that goal. It will begin by analyzing what the 21st century operating environment demands of leaders by providing

a review of relevant joint and Navy doctrine, strategy and policy, the insights of selected successful 21st century operational leaders, and observations from a recent multiagency operation. It will compare the requirements the above place on 21st century operational leaders with the current U.S. Navy officer development continuum and new leader development initiatives being considered within DoD. Finally, it will offer recommendations based on the requirements of the operating environment for potential improvements to the U.S. Navy leader development process - in both education and experience - to better prepare operational leaders for the multiagency operating environment of the 21st century.

While the need to operate effectively in a multiagency environment may seem straightforward, the process for preparing leaders to meet that requirement is not. Organizational biases in DoD and the other governmental agencies, demanding operating schedules, and an ever expanding list of required competencies for operational leaders all present challenges to achieving agreement on a process for developing officers that will be effective in a multiagency environment. Despite these potential obstacles, the leaders of the U.S. Sea Services have stated that the 21st century will require their Services to “... demonstrate flexibility, adaptability and unity of effort in evolving to meet the enduring and emerging challenges and opportunities ahead.”³ The *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21S)* calls for three areas to receive priority in this effort: improve integration and interoperability, enhance awareness, and prepare our people.⁴ If these are indeed the priorities, then the U.S. Navy must make every effort to provide its leaders with a truly multiagency development process.

Joint Policy and Doctrine

Responding to the challenges facing the nation almost inevitably requires a multiagency, interdisciplinary approach that brings to bear the many diverse skills and resources of the Federal government and other public and private organizations.

Joint Publication 3-08 Volume I, page II-1

Current joint policy and doctrine recognize that the 21st century operating environment is different, and that it presents leaders with both opportunities and challenges that will require not only joint service expertise, but also more and better multiagency competencies and perspectives.⁵ “The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) focuses on a strategy for achieving military objectives while contributing to broader national objectives through unified action - integration with other interagency and multinational partners.”^{6,7} The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) believes the solution to meeting the challenges presented to the 21st century joint force is to conduct integrated actions in conjunction with other elements of both national and multinational power to support the nation’s strategic objectives.⁸ For this solution, “(f)uture joint leaders will require more comprehensive knowledge of interagency and foreign cultures and capabilities.”⁹ In an effort to provide military leaders with principles, guidance, and a framework to facilitate coordination during multiagency operations, DoD published Joint Publications 3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I and Volume II.¹⁰ In addition to this doctrine, multiple joint publications for operations, logistics, operational planning, command and control, Civil Support (CS), and Homeland Defense (HD) all call for the U.S. military to more effectively integrate and synchronize its efforts with multiagency organizations to achieve U.S. national and shared international objectives.¹¹ To accomplish this multiagency synchronization requires more than just doctrine and policy. It also requires a leader development process - which includes both education and experience¹² - that will enable military

leaders to effectively lead, operate, plan, and interact in not only a joint service environment but also in a broader and more complicated multiagency operating environment.

The *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development (JOD)* is a “white paper that articulates the CJCS vision for transforming joint officer development, which will produce appropriately prepared senior leadership for the capabilities-based future joint force.”¹³ The *JOD* states that “future joint operations will be planned and executed within a multi-Service, multi-agency, multi-national environment ...”¹⁴ The CJCS vision explains that joint leaders are built on Service officers and believes that the Service and joint officer development processes must produce the largest possible cadre of officers that can integrate the elements and capabilities of the multiagency to meet the challenges of the 21st century.¹⁵ The *JOD* calls for “a Joint Learning Continuum of four independent supporting pillars. These pillars are: Joint Individual Training, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), Joint Experience, and Self-development.”¹⁶ Missing among these pillars is multiagency education and experience. “Coordinating and integrating efforts between the joint force and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control of a military operation.”¹⁷ In short, joint and multiagency are different. While joint policy and doctrine recognize the importance of the multiagency in the contemporary operating environment, they advocate a development process that is militarily focused and incorrectly assume that multiagency competencies and perspectives are a guaranteed byproduct of a joint leader development process.

U.S. Navy Strategy and Policy

Perhaps the most significant vision statement Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Roughead published since taking office is the tri-service and interagency *CS2IS*. It states that achieving our national objectives and building trust among our partner nations “will require an unprecedented level of integration among our maritime forces and enhanced cooperation with the

other instruments of national power, as well as the capabilities of our international partners.”¹⁸

The *CS2IS* recognizes that the 21st century is a multi-polar environment that will present the United States with problems that cannot be resolved by a single nation or military-only effort, but one that requires a multinational approach using all forms of national power to enable America and her partners to achieve their mutual interests.¹⁹ The *CS2IS* states that leaders “will be required to interact with a far greater variety of U.S. and multinational partners and indigenous populations than their predecessors. Professional development ...must be refined accordingly.”²⁰

However, while U.S. Navy strategy is calling for new multiagency solutions, the current U.S. Navy leader development process remains DoD-centric.²¹ Senior officer development in the Navy is driven by both the CJCS *JOD* and U.S. Navy promotion policy which continues to prioritize only Service specific and joint leadership positions, education, and experience. The promotion policy for fiscal year 2009 flag officer promotion board highlighted four core areas to define the best qualified officer: proven performance in command, JPME, completion of a joint duty assignment, and attainment of critical service specific qualifications and certifications.²² The promotion policy directive does not call for nor require any education, experience, or competency in the multiagency.²³ Just as in DoD, U.S. Navy strategy and policy recognize the criticality of multiagency operational competency and perspective for 21st century operations, but the leader development process continues to value only joint and service specific expertise.

Operational Leaders’ Perspectives

Senior operational leaders recognize the need for multiagency integration and leader development, as well. General Victor Renuart, U.S. Air Force, Commander U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), believes that in the 21st century “interagency solutions are more and more critical... In my view, you are less than effective in the interagency world if you have

never been exposed to it in any way as a young officer.”²⁴ He stresses the need to “create a culture among all of our services - active and reserve components alike - that values a mix of operational experience, joint experience, and of interagency experience.”²⁵ NORTHCOM, with 45 intergovernmental and international agencies represented in its headquarters, is just one example of how the Geographic Combatant Commands are becoming more multiagency in their composition. This multiagency composition requires military leaders be able to lead, operate, plan, and integrate effectively with leaders and agencies outside of DoD.²⁶ Senior leaders also see the need for the leader development process to adapt to meet this requirement. General James Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command believes that “Professional Military Education (PME) must further teach our leaders how to identify the value of every Coalition team on the field; militaries that lack U.S. capabilities are no less useful if we have leaders educated to find the advantages brought by other countries’ forces.”²⁷ General Mattis stresses the importance of leaders being able to appreciate view points and values that differ from their own and the need for them to establish effective relationships with other leaders and organizations.²⁸ He believes PME and experience are where leaders need to learn and develop these necessary competencies and perspectives.²⁹ “We have made few if any technological mistakes over the last six years of active operations; but we have made hundreds of human factor errors, illustrating a severe failure to properly educate these officers.”³⁰ Not only do operational leaders need to understand the doctrine, strategy, and policy of the multiagency operating environment, but they must be educated and developed in a manner that enables them to gain the human perspective and to establish the relationships necessary to succeed.

Multiagency Operation Lessons

Observations from recent operations also indicate that the U.S. military and its leaders must be better prepared for the multiagency operating environment. While virtually any recent

major U.S. military operation could be used to demonstrate this point, this paper will use U.S. military support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan³¹ as a prototypical example. U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates stated, "One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success."³² An example of the type of integration Secretary Gates is calling for are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are the primary method of engagement in ISAF. ISAF PRTs "represent the cutting edge in civilian/military operations and provide a test case of those interventions that are likely to remain prominent national security challenges well into the future."³³ The multiagency ISAF PRTs have enabled the DoD to better integrate and operate with its NATO partners, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Agriculture (DoA), Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Treasury (DoT), civilian universities and members of academia, NGOs, and even some major corporations - a true multiagency team.³⁴ Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General James Jones, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), believes that the multiagency PRTs are the key to ISAF's success that has produced improvements in Afghanistan's security, education, public services, health institutions, agriculture, and economic development.³⁵

The process to attain this multiagency integration and effectiveness, however, has not been simple or fast. Developing the current ISAF PRT format required four years of trial and error, in part because many of these agencies simply were not familiar with working together and

did not know how to integrate. Current PRT personnel go through several weeks of training prior to deployment to learn to operate together, and the process continues to evolve. Secretary Gates believes that today's operating environment demands that we "develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills ..."³⁶ While integration of civilian agencies with these capabilities and experience is the best solution, the Secretary recognizes that for the foreseeable future DoD is the only agency with the resources and manpower to accomplish these tasks.³⁷ He has called for the military to "institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities."³⁸ One such example of this concept is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) which is a "prototype concept of operations, outlined operational connections, and procedures to improve planning and coordination between a combatant command staff and the civilian agencies of the U.S. government."³⁹ "A JIACG's role is to coordinate with U.S. government civilian agencies operational planning in contingency operations. It supports day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters and advises planners regarding civilian agency operations, capabilities, and limitations. It also provides perspective in the coordinated use of national power."⁴⁰ While PRTs and JIACGs are important and promising concepts, they still represent largely reactive, just-in-time, and on-the-job training processes. DoD cannot wait years for the multiagency organizations to learn to work together, nor can it rely on ad hoc processes. Instead, DoD must be proactive in providing a leader development process that produces the largest possible cadre of leaders with the competencies and perspectives to succeed.

Operationalizing the Strategy

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the document that is responsible for "operationalizing" the DoD strategy and vision. The 2006 QDR recognized the requirement for leaders to operate effectively in the multiagency environment and dedicated an entire section to

“Developing a 21st Century Force.”⁴¹ In preparing DoD leaders for the 21st century, the QDR called for improvements in cultural and language education, training exercises to enhance a leader’s understanding of how the multiagency and the military can work together to achieve national objectives, the transition of the National Defense University (NDU) to a true National Security University (NSU), and the development of a National Security Planning Process (NSPP).⁴² While each of these is a good initiative, are they enough? Do these QDR initiatives equate to a comprehensive vision and plan that will meet the *JOD* objectives in not only the joint but the multiagency environment? Is it enough to have one university that provides only a very few senior military leaders with multiagency education? Are occasional training exercises and reactive just-in-time training adequate? Or, would military leaders gain greater experience, understanding and perspective from multiagency duty assignments similar to the joint duty assignments required by current legislation?

New Initiatives

There are several organizations studying new initiatives to broaden existing education programs and enhance military integration with the U.S. interagency with the goal of improving the leader development process. Perhaps two of the most promising studies in this area are the Interagency Transformation, Education, and Analysis (ITEA) Program led by NDU, and the much broader and more exhaustive Beyond Goldwater Nichols Phase II (BGN) effort led by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).⁴³ Both studies recognize that 21st century challenges such as stability operations, counter insurgency, HD, CS, natural disasters, trans-national terrorism, economic inequality, immigration, potential pandemics, and resource scarcity require more than just military solutions.⁴⁴ They also acknowledge that the reactive and ad hoc methods for planning and operating currently in use are suboptimal solutions, and improvements to leader development are required. The ITEA Program recommendations for improvement

include: (1) establishing an informal network of subject matter experts across the U.S. interagency via training exercises, education, and Liaison Officer programs; (2) providing broader PME that includes national security studies and interagency education beyond the current JPME curriculum; and (3) creating interagency coordination centers, fusion groups, and task forces for Security, Stability, Transformation, and Reconstruction Operations.⁴⁵ Many of the ITEA recommendations are derived from or consistent with some of those from the BGN study. To highlight a few of the other key BGN recommendations relevant to this thesis, the study also calls for the establishment of:⁴⁶

- Interagency Task Force Headquarters Core Elements - Civilian led groups that could deploy on short notice to augment existing U.S. governmental agencies and Joint Task Forces.
- National security career path options that encourage DoD and other U.S. agencies' leaders to seek out assignments outside their expertise to broaden their interagency experience.
- The Joint Virtual University (JUVU) - An online and distance learning program available to military and government civilians similar to those suggested in the NSU curriculum to broaden multiagency education, competencies, and perspectives.

These two studies provide numerous and comprehensive recommendations for long term solutions to leader development shortfalls. DoD, the interagency, and the U.S. Congress should begin the process of incorporating many of them now. However, the full incorporation of many of these recommendations would require major restructuring of DoD, other U.S. agencies, Congressional legislation, or authoritative National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs). In short, they will likely take a decade or more to fully implement. DoD and the U.S. Navy should not wait that long to adapt the leader development process to meet the existing requirements. Instead, they should institute more specific processes that can have a more immediate impact on leader development and be incorporated into existing U.S. Navy career progressions.

Recommendations - A Faster Way Forward

There are four steps DoD and specifically the U.S. Navy should begin to incorporate now that could have an impact on leader development in a matter of years vice decades. These steps are not intended as a replacement to the more comprehensive recommendations of studies such as ITEA and BGN, but rather initial steps and building blocks to facilitate them. To begin to better incorporate multiagency competencies and perspectives into the leader development process, DoD and the U.S. Navy should: (1) develop multiagency Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) learning areas that are required for all service and joint war colleges; (2) develop and get approval for a NSPP and require leaders to be educated and trained on the process during multiagency PME, training, and duty assignments; (3) conduct a Top Down Review (TDR) of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) to distinguish between and recognize billets that provide strategic-operational planning experience and those that provide multiagency integration and coordination experience ;⁴⁷ (4) seek out more multiagency duty assignments for DoD and U.S. Navy leaders with key U.S. government agencies and multinational partners. As they develop and incorporate these recommendations, they must remember that the improvements cannot be purely competency based. The process must also develop officers that understand the humanistic aspects of leadership and that have the ability to build relationships and appreciate the capabilities and perspectives of each multiagency partner. By doing so, the process will develop leaders that understand how to achieve unity of effort.

The Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) should develop multiagency OPMEP learning areas and objectives that provide DoD and interagency leaders with a comprehensive education on multiagency integration. Each intermediate and senior War College would then develop their own curriculum that satisfies these learning areas. The curricula should provide leaders with training and education on an approved NSPP, and should achieve similar

learning objectives in the multiagency operating environment and planning process that the current U.S. Navy War College (NWC) Joint Military Operations curriculum and education on the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provide leaders in the joint environment. For the U.S. Navy specifically, the program should be added as a fourth quarter of the NWC curriculum with separate experience appropriate curricula for both intermediate and senior level officers. The education must also be incorporated into the NWC distance learning programs to ensure it is available to all leaders in PME programs. The MECC should develop these learning objectives and the NSPP based on the ITEA study, direction from the QDR, and current military doctrine all of which call for better and more integration and coordination between DoD and U.S. multinational partners. The current NWC curriculum, which provides only a handful of seminar sessions on interagency and DoD integration, is inadequate for the 21st century operating environment and does not meet the demands of current doctrine or strategy. For this education to be truly multiagency and incorporate the human aspect, NWC must seek out greater interagency student and faculty involvement than exists in the current JPME program.⁴⁸ Professional and formalized education on the multiagency, a NSPP, and how to achieve unity of effort in multiagency organizations is a necessary foundation for military leaders in the 21st operating environment. Only an education on how to integrate DoD into the multiagency process and use an approved NSPP will enable military leaders to gain the maximum benefit from follow-on training and experience. Once a multiagency curriculum is in place, U.S. Navy promotion policy should be updated to value this broader education and require its completion for senior and flag ranks. By doing so, the U.S. Navy will ensure that the largest cadre of leaders will develop multiagency competencies and internalize the perspectives of other multiagency leaders.⁴⁹

The current JDAL, which is driven by current Goldwater-Nichols legislation, is entirely DoD-centric and does not sufficiently address the requirement for leaders to gain multiagency experience.⁵⁰ As such, it must be updated to incorporate and value the important learning that leaders could gain in multiagency billets. The JDAL is reviewed every five years in accordance with DoD instructions.⁵¹ However, perhaps the most significant review in the last 15 years was conducted in 1996 by the RAND Corporation. Unfortunately, the report focused exclusively on joint and DoD billet issues with no mention of multiagency operations or billets.^{52,53} Currently, military officers can earn joint duty credit in specific billets that provide an accepted level of joint duty experience over a defined period of time. This system is entirely inadequate for addressing the requirement for leaders to gain multiagency experience and for identifying senior leadership billets that should have not only joint but also multiagency certification prerequisites. Accordingly, DoD should conduct a TDR of the JDAL. The TDR should consider which billets on the JDAL provide leaders with joint and military-focused experience and which provide them with experience that is more multiagency focused. Both types of experience should be valued, but DoD must recognize that the experience is different; joint does not equal multiagency. For example, some staff position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operations directorate will likely provide joint experience, but may provide the leader with only minimal multiagency exposure. However, the commanding officer of a PRT will gain broad multiagency exposure during his tour but gain little operational level joint planning experience. There may also be billets on major staffs that are more multiagency, such as NORTHCOM, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Southern Command, that provide adequate experience on both operational level joint planning and multiagency integration. Leaders completing each of these assignments should earn separate certifications: JQO for the traditional military-focused billets and Multiagency Qualified Officer

(MQO) for existing or newly established billets that provide multiagency perspective. The certification that leaders are given cannot blindly assign the same credit for each billet, nor should higher level leadership billets simply require officers to be JQO when in fact those billets require either a MQO or an officer with both certifications. The U.S. Navy should track these qualifications via its Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) system, include language in senior officer promotion policy that recognizes the importance of these AQDs, and require these AQDs for some senior level and flag officer positions.

To expand the number of billets that provide leaders with multiagency experience and exposure, DoD should seek out additional billets with key partners in the U.S. interagency. While current billets in PRTs, multinational headquarters, and multiagency staffs are good, they are not the same as sending military officers to non-DoD/non-military organizations to learn how these agencies think, plan, organize, and operate. Accordingly, additional interagency billets should be established with USAID, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, DoA, DoJ, and DoT.⁵⁴ An example of these types of billets is the Defense Coordinating Officer billets that military officers hold at many of U.S. government agencies.⁵⁵ DoD should increase the number of this type of billet, and the U.S. Navy should ensure that its promotion process rewards and values leaders that serve in these billets and gain this essential experience and perspective. In addition to learning the specifics of these organizations, leaders would also act as Service representatives, provide these other agencies with perspective, and enable them to gain greater understanding on how DoD is structured, plans, thinks, and operates. It is only via this type of experience that leaders will learn what the real value of these organizations are, establish the perspective to build the critical relationships that are not defined by clear cut lines of command, and learn how they can create unity of effort vice unity of command.

Counter Arguments

While the arguments for improving and adapting the leader development process to meet the multiagency requirements of the 21st century operating environment are compelling, there are some opponents to the idea of changing the current process, and there are definitely opponents of the idea of requiring formalized multiagency leader education and experience. There are several individual arguments that can be made, but most of these counter arguments to this thesis can be grouped into three categories: the status quo works adequately, it is too difficult to get agreement on a process and implement it properly, and for the U.S. Navy specifically, there is not enough time in an officer's career progression or enough total officers to mandate this development process. While each argument has supporters, an analysis of the issue shows that the benefits of formalized multiagency leader development outweigh the costs and challenges.

There are those in DoD and throughout the U.S. government and its agencies that believe the status quo is working. This group believes that the current JPME process provides adequate multiagency education and that ad hoc and just-in-time training is enough for DoD officers and agency leaders. However, this process does not meet the tasking in the *JOD* "to produce the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities."⁵⁶ Like the *JOD*, this group incorrectly assumes that joint officer development equals multiagency development, which it clearly does not. If the status quo was adequate, why do leaders and military planners continually make assessments such as: "...the interagency process represents a fundamental weakness in war planning"⁵⁷ and "(o)ur current PME does not prepare officers to identify values unfamiliar to them or treat others with the respect they are due."⁵⁸ The reason for assessments like these is that the status quo is not enough, and the multiagency operating environment of the 21st century demands more.

Other individuals highlight the many obstacles that stand in the way of developing and implementing an approved multiagency education and planning curriculum and construct for leaders to gain multiagency experience. This group believes that it is too difficult to get an authoritative NSPD and to overcome organizational biases within DoD and other governmental agencies. They point out that many interagency leaders will be hesitant to have a larger DoD presence on their staffs or will be concerned that this is a DoD effort to exert control over the interagency process. These challenges are unquestionably real. However, the 21st century is “an era in which (the United States is) unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace.”⁵⁹ It is in these phases of conflict and range of military operations that multiagency unity of effort is more vital than ever. Unity of effort cannot be achieved unless there is a common foundation of education, and leaders interact and develop the relationships they need to value one another’s perspectives. By planning, operating, and learning together, multiagency leaders will learn how each agency works and thinks, and they will learn to value the capabilities that each can bring to bear. Will it be difficult to get an approved NSPD and NSPP and implement the necessary education and development process? Yes it will. However, the 21st century operating environment demands the United States do the hard work.

In the U.S. Navy, some leaders do not believe there is enough time in an officer’s career progression or enough total officers to mandate this leader development process. The issue, however, is not one of enough time or number of personnel, but a question of the priority of the need. As of September 2008, the Navy had 1,357 officers in Individual Augmentee and Global War on Terror Support Assignments worldwide.⁶⁰ Those billets did not exist five years ago. However, based on a CNO mandate, the Navy found these officers and created these billets to fill an emergent need. Given the clear statements in the *CS2IS*, it can be argued that CNO

Roughead sees the same emergent need for multiagency education and experience in 21st century leaders. A multiagency education curriculum could be provided to leaders as an add-on to the current JPME process by extending the course length by as little as ten weeks. Using the new JQO process, some officers are earning full joint billet credit in only 12 months. The same could be possible for multiagency billet experience and accreditation. This thesis recommends that multiagency experience be tracked as a distinct AQD and be valued equivalently but separately from joint experience. Both JQO and MQO should be valued, and both are needed. However, only a few leaders will need both JQO and MQO certifications. For those few that need both, an additional 14 months of training is not a high cost for the benefits gained.

Conclusion

The current leader development process does not meet the doctrinal, strategic, operational, or security requirements of the 21st century operating environment. The process does not provide leaders with the education, experience, competencies, or perspectives to lead, coordinate, plan, and integrate with their multiagency partners and achieve unity of effort. A formalized multiagency leader development process, which includes required education and experience, should be created and implemented. The process must include OPMEP learning objectives that provide leaders with the competencies to integrate with the multiagency and to effectively use an approved NSPP. The educational process must provide leaders with the interaction and interpersonal skills to enable them to understand and value the perspectives and capabilities of each leader, agency, and partner. The leader development process must also include multiagency experience that enables DoD and partner leaders to learn how one another think, plan, and operate. This experience will build upon the education they receive, enable them to enhance their competencies, and develop the perspectives and values required to achieve unity of effort in the 21st century operating environment. Finally, the U.S. Navy promotion policy and

process must recognize this education and experience. Unless this leader development process is incorporated into promotion requirements, it will be difficult to achieve an enduring change that will enable the U.S. Navy to meet the requirements of the multiagency operating environment.

¹ James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower* (Washington D.C., October 2007), p. 4.

² In 1986, the United States passed the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and officially codified the requirement for military officers to complete a joint certification process. While some Services embraced the concept of joint education and experience for their officers, the U.S. Navy did not. The Defense Report to the President and Congress Goldwater-Nichols Implementation Reports from 1996 to 2004 show that despite the requirement for all flag and general officers to complete a joint duty qualification process fewer than fifty percent of U.S. Navy flag officers were certified as joint qualified during that time. The 2005 report shows that only seventy-three percent were qualified. According to U.S. Navy Personnel Command Director of Officer Career Progression, Pers-80 and the Secretary of the Navy *Precept Convening FY-09 Promotion Selection Board to Consider Officers in the Line on the Active Duty List of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent Grade of Rear Admiral (Lower Half)* dated 27 November 2007, it was not until 2007 that the U.S. Navy insisted that one hundred percent of its flag selections be joint qualified.

³ James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower* (Washington D.C., October 2007), p. 11.

⁴ James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower* (Washington D.C., October 2007), pp. 11-14.

⁵ Walter Sharp, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination in Joint Operations Volume I, Joint Publication 3-08* (Washington D.C., 17 March 2006), pp I-1-10.

⁶ The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations is the lead document for joint operations concepts from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

⁷ Richard B. Meyers, Richard B. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations ver 2.0* (Washington D.C., August 2005), p. vii.

⁸ Richard B. Meyers, Richard B. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations ver 2.0* (Washington D.C., August 2005), p. 11.

⁹ Richard B. Meyers, Richard B. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations ver 2.0* (Washington D.C., August 2005), p. 24.

¹⁰ Walter Sharp, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination in Joint Operations Volume I, Joint Publication 3-08* (Washington D.C., 17 March 2006), p i.

¹¹ Multiple sources including:

Peter Pace, *Joint Operations* (Washington D.C., 17 September 2006, Incorporating Change 1 13 February 2008), p. II-4.

Michael G. Mullen, *Joint Logistics* (Washington D.C., 18 July 2008), pp i-xxiv.

Peter Pace, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington D.C., 26 December 2006), pp II-6-12, p IV-1.

¹² U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group research and a survey of 107 Flag and General Officers from all four U.S. Services and multiple international militaries indicates that senior and operational leaders believe that the top three most critical processes to their development as effective leaders were: experience, exposure, and education. Based on Stockdale Group Research Survey conducted in 2007 the details of which are available in Lt Col Marci Ludlow, PhD. "236 Stars on Leadership Development: An Analysis of the 2007 Stockdale Group Survey Data", (master's thesis, US Naval War College, 2007).

¹³ Peter Pace, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington D.C., November 2005), p. iv.

¹⁴ Peter Pace, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington D.C., November 2005), p. 1.

¹⁵ Peter Pace, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington D.C., November 2005), pp 1-5.

¹⁶ Peter Pace, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington D.C., November 2005), p. 5.

¹⁷ Walter Sharp, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination in Joint Operations Volume I, Joint Publication 3-08* (Washington D.C., 17 March 2006), p viii.

¹⁸ James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower* (Washington D.C., October 2007), p. 3.

¹⁹ James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower* (Washington D.C., October 2007), pp 1-10.

²⁰ James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower* (Washington D.C., October 2007), p 15.

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- ²¹ Secretary of the Navy, *Precept Convening FY-09 Promotion Selection Board to Consider Officers in the Line on the Active Duty List of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent Grade of Rear Admiral (Lower Half)* (Millington, TN, 27 November 2007), Appendix B. Also based on interviews with Pers-80, Director Officer Career Progression, Pers-41M, Surface Community Manager, Pers-43M Aviation Officer Community Manager, Pers-432 Head Aviation Detailer by author, Millington, TN, April 2-3 2008.
- ²² Secretary of the Navy, *Precept Convening FY-09 Promotion Selection Board to Consider Officers in the Line on the Active Duty List of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent Grade of Rear Admiral (Lower Half)* (Millington, TN, 27 November 2007), Appendix B.
- ²³ Secretary of the Navy, *Precept Convening FY-09 Promotion Selection Board to Consider Officers in the Line on the Active Duty List of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent Grade of Rear Admiral (Lower Half)* (Millington, TN, 27 November 2007), Appendix B.
- ²⁴ General Victor Renuart interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Colorado Springs, CO, April 2008.
- ²⁵ General Victor Renuart interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Colorado Springs, CO, April 2008.
- ²⁶ General Victor Renuart interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Colorado Springs, CO, April 2008.
- ²⁷ General James Mattis interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Newport, RI, 7 March 2008.
- ²⁸ General James Mattis interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Newport, RI, 7 March 2008.
- ²⁹ General James Mattis interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Newport, RI, 7 March 2008.
- ³⁰ General James Mattis interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Newport, RI, 7 March 2008.
- ³¹ ISAF is a NATO multinational multiagency operation whose mission is to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community in maintaining security within its area of operation. ISAF supports the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure environment conducive to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and the reconstruction of the country.
- ³² Robert M. Gates, "Landon Lecture" (lecture, Manhattan: Kansas State University, 26 November 2007).
- ³³ Henrietta Holsman Fore, "Aligning 'Soft' Power with 'Hard' Power," *Parameters Volume 38 Issue 2* (Summer 2008) pp. 14-25.
- ³⁴ Robert M. Gates, "Landon Lecture" (lecture, Manhattan: Kansas State University, 26 November 2007).
- ³⁵ James L. Jones, "Statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee" (Washington D.C., 8 March 2007).
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- ³⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group" USJFCOM website http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiagc.htm (accessed 24 October 2008).
- ⁴⁰ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group" USJFCOM website http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiagc.htm (accessed 24 October 2008).
- ⁴¹ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington D.C., Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006).
- ⁴² Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington D.C., Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), pp. 75-86.
- ⁴³ Beyond Goldwater-Nichols is a comprehensive study that addresses potential reorganization of much of the U.S. interagency and detailing a full list of its many recommendations goes well beyond the scope of this paper.
- ⁴⁴ National Defense University Interagency, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Transformation, Education and Analysis Program, *Interagency, Transformation, Education and Analysis - Pain & Pathos* a brief developed by Lee Blank, Director NSCG.
- ⁴⁵ National Defense University Interagency, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Transformation, Education and Analysis Program, *Interagency, Transformation, Education and Analysis - Pain & Pathos* a brief developed by Lee Blank, Director NSCG.
- ⁴⁶ Clark A. Murdock et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 2 (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), pp. 131-139.
- ⁴⁷ U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, "2008 Executive Summary" (advanced research project, U.S. Naval War College, 2008), pp. 9-12.
- ⁴⁸ While the current NWC JPME program has extensive multinational student participation via the National Command College, the number of interagency students and faculty members is not adequate to provide leaders with the required interagency perspective and view point.

⁴⁹ It should be recognized that U.S. Navy promotion policy can be amended to include more specific requirements than current U.S. Title 10 law. For example, the Navy already requires all officers being considered for commander (O-5) command to have completed JPME I prior to the selection board.

⁵⁰ John F. Shank et al, *Who is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List* (Santa Monica, C, 1996) RAND Corporation website http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR574.pdf (accessed 24 October 2008).

⁵¹ David S.C. Chu, "DoD Joint Officer Management Program DoD Instruction 1300.19 Incorporating Change 1," 21 August 2008.

⁵² John F. Shank et al, *Who is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List* (Santa Monica, C, 1996) RAND Corporation website http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR574.pdf (accessed 24 October 2008).

⁵³ The report focused exclusively on determining which billets in DoD provide officers with joint experience and produced three recommendations that addressed how much time an officer needed to spend in a joint billet to gain the required experience, the rank an officer must be to begin earning joint duty credit, and whether or not in-Service billets should provide joint credit.

⁵⁴ While this list is not necessarily all inclusive, the above are the key agencies where the initial additional billets should be sought as they are the current and key interagency partners.

⁵⁵ Defense Coordinating Officers and their staffs - Defense Coordinating Elements - serve as the point of contact for Defense Support to Civil Authorities and act as facilitators to enhance DoD and interagency coordination and integration.

⁵⁶ Peter Pace, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (Washington D.C., November 2005), p. 3.

⁵⁷ Gregory Hooker, *Shaping The Plan For Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005) p. 36. as reprinted in "Extracts from Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom," (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2008).

⁵⁸ General James Mattis interview with U.S. Naval War College Stockdale Group, Newport, RI, 7 March 2008.

⁵⁹ James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Seapower* (Washington D.C., October 2007), p 2.

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